Chen Schor, CEO of Adicet Bio, faced a defining moment in July 2025. The company's oncology program, ADI-270, had failed to demonstrate the efficacy needed to justify continued investment. Rather than dilute resources across multiple indications, Schor made a brutal but strategic decision: terminate ADI-270, reduce headcount by 30%, and redirect all remaining capital toward ADI-001 for autoimmune diseases. The move extended Adicet's cash runway from mid-2026 to Q4 2026—buying precious months to generate the Phase 1 clinical data that will determine whether this micro-cap biotech survives or disappears. For context, Adicet's market capitalization hovers around $57 million at a stock price near $0.69, a valuation that prices in catastrophic failure while offering lottery-ticket upside if ADI-001 proves transformative. The company is pursuing one of biotechnology's most ambitious frontiers: allogeneic gamma delta CAR-T cell therapy for autoimmune conditions—diseases where patients' immune systems attack their own tissues. If ADI-001 delivers durable remissions in lupus, systemic sclerosis, or other devastating autoimmune diseases, Adicet could pioneer an entirely new treatment paradigm worth tens of billions. If the therapy fails to show meaningful efficacy, Adicet will run out of cash in 2026 with no revenue, no approved products, and limited options beyond insolvency or fire-sale acquisition.
What makes Adicet's situation particularly high-stakes is the science it's validating. Gamma delta T cells represent a distinct T cell subset with innate-like properties that can recognize stressed or transformed cells without requiring HLA matching—the major barrier to allogeneic (off-the-shelf) cell therapies. Traditional CAR-T therapies like Kymriah and Yescarta use alpha beta T cells and require manufacturing individual treatments for each patient, costing $400,000+ per patient with 3-4 week manufacturing timelines. Adicet's allogeneic approach could theoretically enable mass production of cryopreserved doses available off-the-shelf at dramatically lower cost. The company's non-gene-edited platform avoids complex genetic modifications that increase manufacturing costs and regulatory complexity. Early preclinical data showed Adicet's gamma delta CAR-T cells demonstrated superior resilience to lymphocyte-mediated clearance compared to gene-edited platforms, suggesting potential for longer persistence in patients. However, preclinical promise means nothing without clinical validation. Adicet is enrolling patients across six autoimmune indications in its Phase 1 study of ADI-001: lupus nephritis, systemic lupus erythematosus, systemic sclerosis, idiopathic inflammatory myopathy, stiff person syndrome, and ANCA-associated vasculitis. Preliminary data expected in late 2025 will reveal whether the science translates into actual patient benefit. For investors, Adicet represents the ultimate high-risk, high-reward biotech speculation—appropriate only for those willing to lose 80-100% of capital in exchange for potential 5-10x returns if the therapy works.
Business Model & Competitive Moat: Unproven Science Meets Massive Market
Adicet Bio operates as a pure clinical-stage biotechnology company with zero revenue, no approved products, and no near-term path to commercialization. The business model, typical for early-stage biotechs, involves burning cash to fund clinical trials, with monetization dependent on either: (1) successfully developing therapies through FDA approval and commercial launch, (2) licensing or partnering assets to larger pharmaceutical companies in exchange for upfront payments and royalties, or (3) being acquired before reaching profitability. Adicet's Q2 2025 financials illustrate the cash burn reality: R&D expenses totaled $28.4 million for the quarter, while general and administrative costs were $4.0 million, resulting in a $31.2 million quarterly net loss. With $125 million in cash as of June 30, 2025, and no revenue generation, the arithmetic is brutal—at current burn rates, Adicet exhausts its cash in Q4 2026, approximately 15 months away. The 30% workforce reduction and ADI-270 termination were designed to reduce quarterly burn from $32 million to approximately $25-28 million, extending runway but not solving the fundamental problem: Adicet needs either transformative clinical data to attract partnerships, or it must raise additional capital through highly dilutive equity offerings or debt financing on unfavorable terms.
Adicet's potential competitive moat, if it materializes, would stem from three sources: first-mover advantage in gamma delta allogeneic CAR-T for autoimmune diseases, proprietary manufacturing know-how for non-gene-edited gamma delta cells, and regulatory pathway learnings from FDA interactions that accelerate follow-on programs. The company claims to be the first to present clinical data on off-the-shelf gamma delta CAR-T therapy, positioning ADI-001 as a potential category-definer if efficacy proves compelling. First-mover advantages in biotech are real but fragile—they provide 18-24 months of exclusivity before fast-followers catch up with next-generation programs. Adicet's non-gene-edited approach could create manufacturing cost advantages versus gene-edited competitors, potentially enabling faster scale-up and lower cost of goods sold (COGS) if the therapy reaches commercialization. However, these theoretical moats mean nothing without clinical proof-of-concept. The autoimmune disease market Adicet targets is enormous—over $50 billion globally—with existing therapies (biologics like Humira, rituximab, immunosuppressants) offering incomplete efficacy and significant side effects. Patients with refractory lupus or systemic sclerosis have few options beyond chronic disease management. If ADI-001 delivers durable remissions with acceptable safety profiles, it could capture meaningful market share. But 'if' is doing enormous work in that sentence. Cell therapy in autoimmune diseases is unproven, with high risks of toxicity (cytokine release syndrome, neurotoxicity) and uncertain durability. Adicet must demonstrate not just safety and initial response, but sustained remission without relapse—a high bar that will take years of follow-up to establish conclusively.
ADI-001 Pipeline: Six Indications, One Last Chance
ADI-001 represents Adicet's entire clinical pipeline following the ADI-270 cancellation. The therapy is an allogeneic gamma delta CAR-T cell product targeting CD20, a protein expressed on B cells that drives autoimmune pathology in diseases like lupus and rheumatoid arthritis. By eliminating pathogenic B cells, ADI-001 aims to reset the immune system and induce long-term remission. The FDA's Fast Track designation granted in February 2025 for refractory systemic lupus erythematosus (SLE) with extrarenal involvement and systemic sclerosis (SSc) validates the regulatory pathway and ensures more frequent FDA interactions, potentially accelerating approval timelines if efficacy materializes. Fast Track designation doesn't guarantee approval—it simply recognizes serious unmet medical need and provides regulatory support. Adicet's Phase 1 study is enrolling patients across six autoimmune indications: lupus nephritis (LN), systemic lupus erythematosus (SLE), systemic sclerosis (SSc), idiopathic inflammatory myopathy (IIM), stiff person syndrome (SPS), and ANCA-associated vasculitis (AAV). This multi-indication approach maximizes optionality—if ADI-001 works in one or two conditions but not others, Adicet can focus development on responsive populations. However, it also fragments patient enrollment, potentially delaying time-to-data for any single indication.
Preliminary clinical data is expected in the second half of 2025, likely at a medical conference in Q4. This dataset will be the single most important catalyst for Adicet's future. Investors should watch for several key metrics: (1) Safety profile—specifically incidence and severity of cytokine release syndrome (CRS), neurotoxicity, and immune-related adverse events. Grade 3-4 CRS or frequent neurotoxicity would be red flags. (2) Efficacy signals—disease activity scores, autoantibody levels, organ function improvement in treated patients compared to baseline. Even modest improvements (30-40% response rates) would be encouraging for Phase 1. (3) Durability—whether responses are transient (weeks) or sustained (months). Durability will take longer-term follow-up, but initial signals matter. (4) Dosing insights—optimal dose levels, expansion cohorts, and patient selection criteria. If the late-2025 data shows acceptable safety and encouraging early efficacy signals, Adicet's stock could double or triple overnight as investors reprice success probabilities. Conversely, if safety issues emerge or efficacy is unimpressive, the stock could crater 50-70% as the path to value narrows dramatically. This binary outcome dynamic is characteristic of clinical-stage biotech and requires investors to size positions accordingly—treat Adicet as a speculative allocation, not a core holding.
Financial Reality Check: 15 Months to Prove or Perish
Adicet Bio's financial situation is stark. As of June 30, 2025, the company held $125.0 million in cash, cash equivalents, and short-term investments—down from $176.3 million at year-end 2024, representing $51 million burned in six months. Q2 2025 net loss was $31.2 million, driven by $28.4 million in R&D expenses and $4.0 million in G&A costs. Management guidance states current cash funds operations into Q4 2026, implying approximately 15-16 months of runway from mid-2025. The workforce reduction and ADI-270 discontinuation should reduce quarterly burn by $3-5 million, extending runway modestly but not eliminating the fundamental problem. Adicet has no revenue, no commercial products, and no immediate partnerships providing cash infusions. The company must therefore either: (1) deliver compelling Phase 1 data in late 2025 to attract a pharmaceutical partner willing to pay upfront fees and fund further development, (2) raise additional capital through equity financing, likely at dilutive terms given the stock's sub-$1 price, or (3) explore strategic alternatives including asset sales or acquisition. None of these options are attractive from current shareholders' perspectives. Partnerships would validate the science but typically involve giving away 50-70% of economics to the pharma partner. Equity raises at current valuations would be massively dilutive—raising $100 million at $0.70/share would roughly double share count, cutting existing shareholders' ownership in half. Acquisition at current valuations would likely offer minimal premiums.
The best-case scenario for Adicet's finances involves positive Phase 1 data in late 2025 followed by a partnership announcement in early-to-mid 2026. A typical biotech partnership for Phase 1-stage assets might involve $50-150 million upfront payment plus development milestones and royalties. This would immediately extend Adicet's runway by 2-3 years and de-risk the balance sheet, allowing the company to advance ADI-001 into Phase 2 without dilutive financings. However, partnerships take 6-12 months to negotiate even after positive data, and there's no guarantee pharmaceutical companies will view gamma delta CAR-T in autoimmune diseases as sufficiently de-risked to commit capital. The worst-case scenario involves unimpressive Phase 1 data, no partnership interest, and forced capital raising in mid-2026 on desperate terms—potentially a reverse stock split followed by equity raise at 50-70% discounts to prevailing prices, massively diluting existing holders. Investors must understand Adicet is in a race against cash depletion, with approximately 12-15 months to demonstrate sufficient proof-of-concept to avoid a financial crisis. This timeline risk amplifies the already-substantial clinical risk inherent in early-stage cell therapy development.
Leadership & Strategy: Chen Schor's All-or-Nothing Pivot
Chen Schor has served as President and CEO of Adicet Bio since joining the company, bringing experience in biotechnology operations and clinical development. Schor's defining strategic decision came in July 2025 with the termination of ADI-270 and 30% workforce reduction—a brutal but arguably necessary move to focus resources on the highest-potential asset. The decision demonstrated willingness to make difficult choices rather than spreading limited capital across multiple failing programs, a discipline many cash-strapped biotechs lack. Schor's public statements emphasize that Adicet is 'approaching an exciting inflection point' with 'significant data milestones on the horizon,' language that signals confidence in ADI-001's clinical trajectory. However, CEO optimism is standard practice in biotech, and investors should focus on data rather than narrative. Schor's strategic challenge is balancing aggressive enrollment in the ADI-001 study to generate timely data against prudent cash management to avoid running out of money before reaching catalysts. The company must enroll enough patients across six indications to generate statistically meaningful safety and efficacy signals, but enrollment costs money—patient screening, treatment manufacturing, clinical site payments, data monitoring. If enrollment is too slow, data arrives too late to secure partnerships before cash runs out. If enrollment is too aggressive, Adicet burns through capital before data matures. This tightrope walk will define Schor's success or failure as CEO.
Schor's broader strategic vision involves establishing gamma delta CAR-T therapy as a new autoimmune treatment modality, positioning Adicet as the category leader that larger pharmaceutical companies either partner with or acquire. This strategy is textbook early-stage biotech: prove a novel mechanism, generate clinical proof-of-concept, then monetize through partnerships or exit rather than attempting to build full commercial infrastructure. The logic is sound—Adicet lacks the capital and scale to compete with large pharma in commercialization, but as a first-mover with clinical data, it has leverage to negotiate favorable partnership terms or acquisition premiums. Execution risk is enormous. Schor must deliver compelling data, negotiate partnerships on acceptable terms, and manage stakeholder expectations (investors, employees, FDA) throughout. His track record will be judged entirely by the late-2025 Phase 1 readout—success makes him a visionary who navigated a turnaround, failure makes him another CEO of a failed biotech. For investors evaluating Adicet, Schor's leadership is a secondary consideration compared to the science and data. Even brilliant CEOs can't overcome flawed biology, and even mediocre CEOs can succeed if the therapy works. Focus on the ADI-001 mechanism, preclinical data, and upcoming clinical results rather than management hagiography.
Competitive Landscape: The Gamma Delta CAR-T Arms Race
Adicet Bio operates in an emerging but increasingly crowded field of gamma delta T cell therapy developers. The global gamma delta T cell cancer therapy market was valued at $1.2 billion in 2024 and is projected to reach $5.6 billion by 2033, representing 18.4% compound annual growth—attractive growth rates that have attracted multiple competitors. Key players include Adicet, Acepodia, Adaptate Therapeutics, Cytomed Therapeutics, Expression Therapeutics, Gadeta, GammaDelta Therapeutics (owned by Takeda), IN8bio, Kiromic Biopharma, Lava Therapeutics, Regeneron Pharmaceuticals, and TC Biopharm. Most competitors are focused on oncology applications, giving Adicet potential differentiation through its autoimmune disease focus post-ADI-270 cancellation. However, this differentiation is double-edged: if gamma delta CAR-T proves effective in cancer, competitors will inevitably expand into autoimmune indications, eroding Adicet's first-mover advantage. Conversely, if oncology programs fail, it may signal fundamental issues with gamma delta cell therapy's efficacy or safety that would also doom Adicet's autoimmune programs.
Adicet's claimed competitive advantages center on being first-to-clinic with off-the-shelf gamma delta CAR-T data and its non-gene-edited manufacturing approach. The first-mover claim has value—Adicet's late-2025 data will establish benchmarks for safety and efficacy that competitors must meet or exceed. If ADI-001 demonstrates strong safety and encouraging efficacy, Adicet can use this data to negotiate partnerships while competitors are still enrolling Phase 1 studies. The non-gene-edited approach potentially offers manufacturing simplicity and cost advantages versus platforms requiring complex genetic modifications like CRISPR-based gene editing. However, competitors are pursuing diverse approaches, and it's unclear whether gene-edited or non-gene-edited platforms will prove superior—the answer likely depends on specific disease contexts and cell characteristics. Adicet's broader competitive threat comes not just from other gamma delta programs but from alternative autoimmune therapies including next-generation biologics, small molecule inhibitors of inflammatory pathways, and autologous (patient-derived) CAR-T approaches that may prove safer despite higher costs. The autoimmune therapy market is massive but also highly competitive, with entrenched players like AbbVie (Humira/Skyrizi), Johnson & Johnson (Remicade/Stelara), and multiple biosimilar competitors. For Adicet to capture meaningful share, ADI-001 must demonstrate not just efficacy but substantial superiority over existing standards of care—a high bar given that many autoimmune patients respond to current biologics, albeit incompletely.
Risks & Challenges: Clinical, Financial, and Existential Threats
- •Clinical Failure Risk - The Core Existential Threat: Adicet's entire value proposition depends on ADI-001 demonstrating acceptable safety and meaningful efficacy in Phase 1. Cell therapy in autoimmune diseases is unproven, with high risks of cytokine release syndrome (CRS), neurotoxicity, and on-target/off-tumor toxicity if gamma delta cells attack healthy tissues. If late-2025 Phase 1 data shows severe toxicities or lacks efficacy signals, Adicet's stock could collapse 70-90% as investors recognize the science doesn't work. Even modest safety issues or marginal efficacy would severely impair partnership prospects and force Adicet into fire-sale scenarios. This is binary risk—either the therapy works and Adicet survives, or it doesn't and the company becomes insolvent. Investors must size positions accordingly, treating Adicet as lottery-ticket speculation rather than core portfolio holding.
- •Cash Runway Crisis and Dilution Risk: With only $125 million and 15-month runway to Q4 2026, Adicet faces imminent financing needs regardless of clinical data. If Phase 1 data is positive, the company might raise capital on reasonable terms or secure partnerships. If data is ambiguous or negative, Adicet will be forced into desperate financing—likely reverse stock split followed by heavily discounted equity raises that dilute existing shareholders 50-80%. At current sub-$1 stock prices, Adicet risks Nasdaq delisting if the stock remains below $1 for extended periods, forcing a reverse split purely for compliance reasons. Any capital raise at current valuations would be massively dilutive given the $57 million market cap. Investors buying today must assume their ownership will be significantly diluted within 12-18 months absent positive catalysts.
- •Regulatory and Development Uncertainty: Fast Track designation provides FDA support but doesn't reduce regulatory standards for approval. Cell therapies face rigorous safety and efficacy requirements, with FDA typically requiring randomized Phase 2 data or compelling single-arm Phase 2 results with durable responses. Adicet's path to approval likely involves 3-5 years of additional clinical development beyond current Phase 1, requiring $200-400 million in incremental capital that Adicet cannot fund alone. Regulatory setbacks—clinical holds due to adverse events, FDA rejection of trial designs, requirement for additional studies—could delay timelines and exhaust capital before reaching approval. The multi-indication strategy amplifies regulatory complexity, as each indication may require separate pivotal trials rather than allowing extrapolation across diseases.
- •Manufacturing and Scalability Challenges: Allogeneic cell therapy manufacturing is complex, requiring donor cell sourcing, genetic modification (even non-gene-edited approaches require CAR insertion), expansion, cryopreservation, and quality control. Adicet likely relies on contract manufacturing organizations (CMOs) for clinical supply, introducing third-party dependence. If ADI-001 succeeds and reaches commercialization, Adicet must either build proprietary manufacturing (capital-intensive) or partner with CMOs willing to produce at scale. Manufacturing failures—contamination, batch failures, supply disruptions—could delay trials or limit commercial supply. Competitors with superior manufacturing capabilities could outcompete Adicet even if ADI-001's clinical profile is strong. Investors should monitor whether Adicet secures manufacturing partnerships or investments in infrastructure as the program advances.
- •Partnership Negotiation Leverage Risk: If ADI-001 data is positive, Adicet will negotiate partnerships from a position of capital desperation. Pharmaceutical partners know Adicet needs cash urgently, reducing Adicet's negotiating leverage. Typical partnerships for Phase 1/2 assets involve 50-70% economic splits favoring the pharma partner, plus milestone structures that defer most payments until late-stage clinical success. Adicet might be forced to accept unfavorable terms—low upfront payments, high pharma economics, limited control over development decisions—simply to secure capital. Existing shareholders would be diluted economically even without dilutive financing. Conversely, if no partners emerge despite positive data (because pharma views gamma delta CAR-T as too risky or unproven), Adicet must pursue dilutive financing anyway, destroying shareholder value through either dilution or insolvency.
Industry Analysis: The $50B+ Autoimmune Therapy Opportunity
Adicet Bio targets the autoimmune disease therapeutics market, valued at over $50 billion globally and growing at mid-to-high single-digit rates. Autoimmune diseases affect approximately 5-8% of the global population (300+ million people), with conditions ranging from rheumatoid arthritis and lupus to inflammatory bowel disease and multiple sclerosis. Current standard-of-care therapies include corticosteroids (prednisone), DMARDs (methotrexate), and biologic agents targeting specific immune pathways (TNF inhibitors like Humira, IL-6 inhibitors like Actemra, B-cell depletion with rituximab). These therapies offer meaningful benefit but significant limitations: many patients achieve only partial responses, requiring chronic treatment indefinitely; side effects include infection risk, infusion reactions, and long-term toxicities; annual costs range from $5,000 for DMARDs to $60,000+ for biologics. The market opportunity for transformative therapies offering durable remissions after one-time or limited treatment courses is enormous—patients and payers would pay premium prices for curative or near-curative approaches that eliminate chronic medication needs.
Cell therapy's potential in autoimmune diseases stems from its ability to 'reset' the immune system through deep B-cell or T-cell depletion followed by immune reconstitution. Early data from autologous CAR-T therapies in lupus and other autoimmune conditions has shown dramatic responses, with some patients achieving drug-free remissions lasting 1-2+ years. However, autologous CAR-T requires patient-specific manufacturing, costs $400,000+ per treatment, and involves 3-4 week manufacturing timelines—limiting scalability and accessibility. Adicet's allogeneic approach could theoretically address these limitations by enabling off-the-shelf dosing at lower costs ($50,000-150,000 per treatment estimated) with immediate availability. The challenge is proving that allogeneic cells, lacking perfect immune matching to patients, can achieve comparable efficacy and safety to autologous approaches. Industry trends favor cell therapy expansion into autoimmune diseases: multiple pharmaceutical companies including Bristol Myers Squibb, Novartis, and Gilead Sciences have initiated or acquired autoimmune cell therapy programs, validating the strategic rationale. Regulatory pathways are becoming clearer as FDA and EMA gain experience reviewing cell therapy applications. The market is at an inflection point where first-movers with compelling clinical data could establish category leadership and capture disproportionate market share before the space becomes crowded. For Adicet specifically, success would position the company as a pioneer in a nascent category with potential $5-10 billion peak revenue opportunity if ADI-001 captures even 10-15% of addressable autoimmune patient populations. Failure would relegate Adicet to a footnote as competitors with superior platforms or deeper resources capture the opportunity instead.
Investment Thesis: Lottery Ticket or Worthless Paper?
The bull case for Adicet Bio is straightforward but requires extreme optimism: if late-2025 Phase 1 data shows ADI-001 is safe and generates encouraging early efficacy signals in lupus, systemic sclerosis, or other autoimmune conditions, Adicet's $57 million market cap massively undervalues the opportunity. Successful cell therapy companies in autoimmune diseases could eventually command multi-billion-dollar valuations—if ADI-001 proves comparable to autologous CAR-T responses seen in early lupus studies (80-90% response rates, durable remissions), Adicet would become a takeover target or partnership magnet overnight. Stock could easily quintuple from $0.69 to $3-4 on positive Phase 1 data as investors reprice success probabilities from 10-15% currently to 40-50% with clinical validation. The first-mover advantage in gamma delta allogeneic CAR-T for autoimmune diseases could create 18-24 months of market exclusivity before competitors catch up, allowing Adicet to negotiate partnerships on favorable terms or command acquisition premiums of $500 million to $1 billion (10-20x current market cap). The Fast Track designation accelerates regulatory pathways, potentially shortening time-to-approval and reducing cumulative development costs. Bulls argue current valuation prices in near-certain failure, creating asymmetric risk/reward where downside is capped at -80% but upside could be +300-500% if the science works. This makes Adicet appropriate for speculative allocations in high-risk biotech portfolios where 10-20 positions are sized small enough that individual failures are tolerable but winners fund overall returns.
The bear case is equally straightforward and arguably more probable: Adicet is a cash-burning clinical-stage biotech pursuing unproven science with 15-month runway, sub-$1 stock price, and no near-term path to profitability. Phase 1 cell therapy trials frequently encounter safety issues (cytokine release syndrome, neurotoxicity) that halt development or require dose reductions that impair efficacy. Even if safety is acceptable, efficacy in autoimmune diseases may be marginal or transient—early response rates could be 30-40% rather than the 80%+ needed to justify commercial development, or responses could last weeks rather than years. Partnership prospects are uncertain even with positive data, as big pharma may view gamma delta CAR-T as too early-stage or too risky to commit capital. Adicet's financial position is desperate—the company must raise capital in 2026 regardless of data, likely through massively dilutive equity raises that cut existing shareholders' ownership 50-70%. At $0.69 stock price, Adicet risks Nasdaq delisting and reverse splits that historically destroy shareholder value through technical selling pressure. The company has no revenue, no approved products, no partnerships, and faces 8-10 well-funded competitors pursuing similar approaches. Bears argue Adicet is likely worth zero or close to zero, with current market cap reflecting speculative hope rather than fundamental value. Historical biotech failure rates exceed 90% for Phase 1 programs, suggesting overwhelming odds against success. Even partial success may not save shareholders from dilution—if Phase 1 shows modest efficacy requiring years of additional development and $300+ million in capital, existing holders get diluted into irrelevance before any commercialization upside materializes.
The balanced view acknowledges Adicet is extreme speculation appropriate only for investors who: (1) can afford total loss of invested capital, (2) understand biotech clinical risk and binary outcomes, (3) size positions at 1-3% of portfolio maximum, and (4) have investment horizons tolerating 12-24 month hold periods through volatile catalysts. Adicet is not an investment—it's a bet on whether gamma delta CAR-T works in autoimmune diseases. If you believe the science has a 20-30% probability of success and are willing to lose 80% of capital in exchange for potential 300-500% gains, Adicet offers acceptable risk/reward. If you require predictable cash flows, proven business models, or downside protection, avoid entirely. The late-2025 Phase 1 data will be a binary catalyst: either Adicet survives with renewed funding prospects and partnerships, or it enters a death spiral toward insolvency. Current shareholders should monitor clinical trial enrollment, cash burn rates, and any partnership discussions. New buyers should wait for clearer catalysts—if Phase 1 data is positive, paying 2-3x current price for dramatically de-risked upside may be better risk/reward than buying today and suffering 50% drawdowns if data delays or interim signals are mixed. For speculation-tolerant investors with appropriate position sizing, Adicet merits consideration as a lottery-ticket allocation with asymmetric payoff structure. For everyone else, there are thousands of less risky investment opportunities with better fundamental support.